


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27 May 1956



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* * * *

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

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1. PAKISTANI ATTACK ON AFGHAN FRONTIER POST
PROBABLY PRECLUDES RAPPROCHEMENT

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The reported large-scale Pakistani attack on an Afghan frontier post on 20 May could prevent the meeting between Pakistani president Mirza and Afghan king Zahir Shah scheduled for next month and would appear to preclude any rapprochement between the two countries if the meeting materializes.

Afghan foreign minister Naim claimed on 24 May that 800 Pakistani soldiers, with artillery preparation and cover by two jet aircraft, had participated in the attack. He said that Pakistanis were still in possession of the post and asked the American ambassador in Kabul to send the embassy's military attaché to the scene to verify the facts.

Naim remarked that the incident had occurred just when there had been hopes of reducing tension between the two countries. He added cryptically that it looked as if a "third element" might be playing a hand. It is more likely that the attack was instigated by Karachi, primarily in retaliation for an Afghan ambush of a Pakistani patrol in the same general area on 19 April.

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2. LIBYAN PREMIER PROFESSES INABILITY TO HALT ARMS FLOW TO ALGERIA

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Libyan premier Ben Halim informed French minister Dumarçay on 22 May that the Libyan government cannot control the transit of arms through Libyan territory to Algeria, according to Dumarçay. Ben Halim claimed that the complicity in this arms traffic by junior officers of the Tripolitanian police made official controls useless. He also claimed to be under great pressure from the Egyptians to permit transshipments of arms, pleaded that he "could not be a traitor to the Arab cause," and implicated Tunisian premier Bourghiba in the traffic.

Ambassador Tappin comments that Ben Halim, for domestic considerations, has apparently decided to acknowledge the arms flow to Algeria, with the result that arms shipments to Algeria are likely to increase sharply.



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5. ANTI-RAKOSI SENTIMENTS SPREADING AMONG TOP HUNGARIAN LEADERS

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Hungarian party first secretary Rakosi is now faced with increased general discontent and disaffection and with a widening opposition within the party leadership, in the opinion of the American legation in Budapest.

Rakosi's latest major speech on 18 May disappointed even the most cautious anticipations of his opponents, who had been expecting that some break with past harsh policies would be announced.

The legation believes that a genuine liberalization of Hungarian policy can be achieved only after Rakosi's removal, and states that there are elements within the Foreign Ministry and the party leadership that would welcome a Western diplomatic offensive against Rakosi.

Comment Despite repeated and specific endorsement of Rakosi by the USSR, which apparently fears that his removal would only worsen the Hungarian political situation, the strength of the anti-Rakosi faction has mounted steadily since February. Rakosi's 18 May speech, reportedly made in part as a result of pressure from the central committee, included a perfunctory bow to his opposition, but did not contain any significant policy change.


Unless willing to run counter to present Satellite policy by granting Rakosi increased police powers with which to subdue his party enemies, Moscow may be forced to reconsider its support of an increasingly unpopular and unstable figure.

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7. SOUTH KOREAN CABINET SHAKE-UP



In a major postelection cabinet reshuffle, President Rhee has replaced Defense Minister Son Won-il, Economic Co-ordinator Paek Tu-chin, and the

ministers of finance, public health and reconstruction. Since the election, Rhee has also replaced the home minister and the director of the national police. The changes appear to have been influenced in large degree by factional considerations within the Liberal Party.

Appointment of two national assemblymen to the Ministries of Finance and Public Health presumably resulted from demands by Liberal Party assemblymen for increased influence in the conduct of government. In a press conference Rhee stated that he will attempt to strengthen the Liberal Party, but that he contemplates no major changes in government policies.

Replacement of Son and Paek may represent a further concession to sentiment in the assembly. Paek's devious financial dealings have periodically come under fire in the assembly, while Son was recently attacked in connection with a scandal in army procurement. The dismissal of Son, an able and pro-American official, may represent a concession to opponents of Rhee's defeated running mate, Yi Ki-pung, with whom Son was closely associated.

Appointment of Kim Chong-won ('Tiger Kim') as director of the national police will probably arouse resentment in view of Kim's history of ruthlessness. This appointment suggests that Rhee contemplates no change in his methods of control, and it may, in fact, presage a tightening of police controls.




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9. SOVIET WARSHIPS TO VISIT YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA

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A Soviet naval squadron of one Sverdlov class cruiser and two Skoryy class destroyers of the Black Sea fleet will pay good-will visits to Split, Yugoslavia, from 31 May to 4 June and Durres, Albania, from 5 to 10 June. The vessels are scheduled to return on 12 June.

Comment

This will be the first Soviet naval visit to Yugoslavia. Good-will naval visits were made by the USSR to Albania in June 1954 and August 1955.

10. POSSIBLE REOPENING IN YUGOSLAVIA OF THE DJILAS CASE

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The public reply made in the Yugoslav press on 20 May to a recent "personal and confidential" letter from British Labor Party secretary Morgan Phillips

regarding the treatment accorded Milovan Djilas, suggests that the former top Yugoslav political leader may again be publicly attacked. Without revealing the text of Phillips' letter, the reply sharply attacked it as critical of Yugoslav foreign and internal policies.

Djilas wrote Phillips on 12 April of increasingly harsh measures being taken against him, and attributed them to "changes in the direction of Yugoslav policy." A few days later his wife was charged with disturbing the peace--a development Djilas had predicted in detail as the regime's next effort to "destroy him politically by discrediting him morally."

Djilas reportedly agreed last February to write an article for an American magazine, which presumably would contain his antiregime views. A series of articles attacking the regime in early 1954 cost Djilas his party and official positions. A year later he received a suspended sentence for reaffirming his views to the Western press and calling for an opposition Socialist party. Belgrade also may feel the need to discourage any latent "Djilasism" within Yugoslavia which could have been encouraged by the new line in Moscow.

A renewed attack on Djilas would have the incidental effect of negating the efforts Tito has recently made to counter Western Socialist suspicions before his Moscow visit.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 27 May)

Israel has reported that an Israeli tractor driver was murdered on 24 May about 6 miles from the Jordanian border. The American army attaché in Tel Aviv believes that this incident will substantiate the official and public belief in Israel that recent political and military changes in Jordan will increase tension and incidents on the Israeli-Jordanian border. It may also reinforce the view of the Israeli army that retaliation is the only policy for holding down Arab border violations.

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On 26 May, it was announced in Israel that several roads in the southern part of the country would be closed for certain hours from 27 May through 30 May. The roads to be closed start at Beersheba and run south to a point near the El Auja demilitarized zone and southeast for a few miles toward Jordan.

